Stranded at Sea: Mapping LNG Carrier Shipowners’ Exposure to Stranded Asset Risk
research 2026-11-10
Gas Energy Markets & Policy Shipping Private Finance Report Investment Policy

Stranded at Sea: Mapping LNG Carrier Shipowners’ Exposure to Stranded Asset Risk

About

This report examines who owns the expanding LNG carrier fleet, how exposed these companies are to stranded assets, and what shipowners, financial institutions and insurers can do about it. Using commercial fleet and charter data from mid-September 2026, it maps all 1,111 large LNG carriers (100,000 cbm or more) in service and on order to 125 owner groups, and profiles 31 groups in depth. For each group it looks at fleet growth, idle ships, visible charter cover and working lives beyond 2050. Building on SFOC’s research on LNG carriers since 2023, it moves the focus from the market to the owner. It is written mainly for shipowners, and also for the banks, lessors, export credit agencies and insurers that finance and insure their fleets.

Executive summary


The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since late February 2026 has shaped the year for LNG shipping. It cut off almost a fifth of global LNG supply and briefly lifted charter rates, yet by early October spot rates had fallen 83–91% from their wartime peaks. The resulting jump in gas prices has also hit demand. In Asia, importers have canceled or reconsidered LNG projects, and IEEFA forecasts that European LNG demand could fall about 23% between 2025 and 2030. The war has delayed the fleet’s surplus, not removed it.

Owners are still adding ships. The large LNG carrier fleet has grown from at least 335 vessels in 2016 to 833 today, and a further 278 are on order, about US$69 billion of committed capital. Under the IEA’s net-zero pathway, no new LNG carriers are needed at all. This report finds that stranding has already begun, that exposure is concentrated in a small number of owners, and that more than half of the capacity in service and on order will still be within its design life after 2050.

Owners and financiers who plan now for a smaller LNG fleet will protect more of their asset value than those who keep adding capacity to an oversupplied market. The report calls on:

  • Shipowners to avoid speculative newbuilds and order only against long-term charters, test fleet values against a 25-year economic life and climate-aligned demand, share charter cover and useful-life assumptions vessel by vessel with lenders and investors, and set out how their LNG fleet will peak and decline

  • Banks, lessors and export credit agencies to match loan tenors to firm charter cover, report their LNG carrier exposure, and test whether public guarantees for new LNG carriers are consistent with their climate commitments and risk appetite

  • Marine insurers to reflect transition risk in hull and machinery pricing, and use annual renewals to discuss clients’ transition plans, including fleet age and utilization

Key findings

  1. Oversupply is already committed. The large LNG carrier fleet (100,000 cbm or more) grew from at least 335 vessels in 2016 to 833 today, and its capacity from 54.1 to 140.9 million cbm. A further 278 vessels (51.1 million cbm, 36% of today’s capacity) are on order, 237 of them delivering in 2027 or later. Independent analysts project a surplus of 110–200 vessels.

  2. Stranding is already under way. 78 vessels (9.4% of the fleet, 13.0 million cbm) are idle or laid up. A quarter of the 186 steam turbine carriers are not trading, 4.7 times the rate for other ships. The average LNG carrier scrapped in 2025 was 26 years old, against the 35–40 years owners and lenders often assume. The 2026 Gulf war has idled more ships, but the steam pattern predates it: leaving out the 27 idle ships tied to Qatar’s trade, steam turbines are ten times as likely as other ships to be idle or laid up.

  3. Exposure is concentrated in a few owners. Ten owner groups hold 43.7% of capacity in service and 45.0% of capacity on order. The five largest orderbooks, held by Nakilat, Mitsui OSK Lines, China Merchants, NYK Line and ADNOC, account for 36.3% of all capacity on order.

  4. Charter cover is largely invisible. Only 174 of 833 vessels (21%) have a forward charter expiry on public record, and 84% of those end by 2035. For about four ships in five, the dataset used for this analysis records no forward charter expiry.

  5. The 2050 trap: run the ships, or write them off. On a 30-year design life, 55% of capacity in service and on order is still in its working life after 2050. On the 38-year average lifespan used in the Investment Risk Monitor, the share is 78%. Either these ships lock in emissions beyond shipping’s net-zero target date, or they retire early and the capital is written off. The orderbook alone represents about US$69 billion of committed capital.

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